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CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST DEFENDANTS:
A NECESSARY SOLUTION TO A
RECURRING PROBLEM
JONATHAN M. JACOBSON*

The most important decision of 1979 in the field of antitrust was ProfessionalBeauty Supply, Inc. v'. NationalBeauty Supply, Inc.1 For the first time

in the long history of the Sherman Act,2 a court recognized a right of contribution in antitrust treble damage actions. The impact of ProfessionalBeauty on
the antitrust bar was widespread and immediate. In treble damage actions almost everywhere, defendants began filing cross-claims, third-party complaints

and separate actions for contribution.
Prior to the decision in ProfessionalBeauty, no appellate court had ruled
on whether contribution was available in antitrust cases. 3 The few district

courts that had passed on the issue had ruled that no right to contribution
existed 4 and, apparently, most litigants had assumed the question was settled.5
Since ProfessionalBeauty, however, four circuit court panels 6 and several more
*A.B., Columbia University, 1973; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1976; Member, New York Bar.
1. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1976) (original version at ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)).
3. The courts in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960) and Webster
Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d 616, 619 (4th Cir. 1956) had offered dicta on
the question. The Goldlawr court commented that contribution would not be available; however, the Webster court indicated that defendants would be liable for contribution.
4. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., M.D.L. No. 248 (N.D. Tex. September
1, 1978) (unreported), aff'd sub nom. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass'n, 48 U.S.L.W. 3538 (U.S. February 6, 1980) (No. 79-1214); Olson Farms, Inc. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. 7161,698 (D. Utah 1977), aff'd, 1979-2 Trade Cas. 1162,995
(10th Cir. 1979), rehearingen banc granted, (loth Cir. December 27, 1979); Wilson P. Abraham
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D. La. October 5, 1977) (unreported),
aff'd, 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. January 24, 1980) (No. 79-1144); El Camino
Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. ff 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Labbee v. William
Wrigley Co., No. 4029 (W.D. Wash. December 20, 1974) (unreported); Sabre Shipping Corp.
v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Two other district courts had addressed the question in dicta. Chevalier v. Baird Savings
Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 145 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (contribution available); Baughman v. CooperJarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671, 678 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd in part, revd in part on other
grounds, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.) (contribution not available), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825
(1976). See also Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington
v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
5. The only three law review articles on the topic previous to Professional Beauty had
advocated contribution. Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Coconspiratorsin Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FoRD5IAM L. REv. 111 (1962); Paul, Contribution and IndemnificationAmong Antitrust CoconspiratorsRevisited, 41 FoRDuA m L. R.v.
67 (1972); Note, Contributionin PrivateAntitrust Suits, 63 CoRuELL L. REV. 682 (1978).
6. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167, 183 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass'n, 48 U.S.L.W.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. xxxnI

district courts" have ruled on contribution-related issues. In addition, numerous
articles on the topic have been written,8 legislation has been introduced in
Congress, 9 an alternative legislative solution 0 has been proposed by the Section
of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association, and the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to review the question.""
The antitrust treble damage action has existed since 189012 and it has been
clear from the beginning that damage liability for antitrust violations is joint
and several because a treble damage action is an action in tort.' 3 Why, then,
was so little attention paid to the contribution question until 1979?
3538 (U.S. February 6, 1980) (No. 79-1214); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1979-2
Trade Cas. 162,995 (10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, (10th Cir. December 27, 1979);
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted
sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No.
79-972); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W.
3490 (U.S. January 24, 1980) (No. 79-1144).
7. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 1163,059 (E.D. Ark. 1979);
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 323 (E.D. Pa. August 3, 1979) (unreported);
Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979) (unreported), appeal
docketed, No. 79-2667 (5th Cir. July 26, 1979); Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc.,
62,717 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Corrugated Container Litigation, 1979-1
1979-1 Trade Cas.
Trade Cas. ff 62,689 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted
sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No.
79-972); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979); In re Eastern
Sugar Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 201A (E.D. Pa. April 2, 1979) (unreported); In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 250 (N.D. Ill. March 30, 1979) (unreported).
See also Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, 1979-2 Trade Cas. 1162,781, at 78,495 (M.D. Fla.
1979).
8. E.g., Axinn, Antitrust Legislation by 96th Congress, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1979, at I; Brown,
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1979, at 1; Hibner, Contribution
Among Joint Tort-feasors in Antitrust Cases, 2 ABA ANTITRUST SEcrION 1 (1979); Izard &
Miller, High Price-fixing Awards Require Abolition of Joint, Several Liability, NAT'L L.J.,
August 27, 1979, at 22; Lempert, Storm Brews on Antitrust Contribution, Legal Times of
Washington, June 4, 1979, at 1; Littman & Van Buskirk, The "Dogmas" of Antitrust Actions:
A New Perspective, 24 ANTIRrUST BULL. 687 (1979); Rhodes, Professional Beauty and the
Beast: Contribution in Antitrust Litigation, 61 CHrcAco B. RIc. 11 (1979); Schwartz, Simpson
& Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L.J. 780
(1979); Sellers, Contribution in Antitrust Damage Actions, 24 ViLL. L. REv. 829 (1979); Note,
Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1540 (1980); 33 VAND. L. REv.
979 (1980).
9. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill, known as the Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979, was originally introduced by Senator Bayh (D.-Ind.) as a proposed amendment to the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1979, S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
10. American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Report on Contribution with
Legislative Recommendation, 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-8, E-1 (October 25,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Section Proposal]; see Pollack, Chairman'sReport, 2 ABA ANTIRUSr
SECTION 18-19 (1979).
11. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79972).
12. The private treble damage action was originally section 7 of the Sherman Act. Act of
July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209. The current version is section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906);
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Until recently, treble damage actions were rare; not until the Electrical
Equipment Cases in the early 1960's did the private treble damage antitrust
action become significant.24 Since that time, treble damage actions have become
increasingly pervasive.1 5 Of even greater impact was the 1966 amendment to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 6 which transformed the class
action from a mere permissive joinder device into a rule operating under "the
same principle [as] the Book-of-the-Month Club - the principle that unless a
member affirmatively 'opts' out, then he's 'in. "'7 As a result, class action defendants now face potentially massive liability.
For example, each defendant found guilty of a conspiracy to fix prices may
be liable not only for the overcharge to an entire class on its own sales, but also
for the overcharges on its coconspirators' sales and even, it has been argued, on
the sales of non-defendant, non-conspirators under the "umbrella" theory of
damages.'s In addition, plaintiffs in treble damage cases almost invariably seek
to toll the statute of limitations- by alleging, for example, that the defendants
"fraudulently concealed"20 the conspiracy's existence. Consequently, the damage
Dextone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 60 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1932); Wainwright v.
Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co.,

280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (S.D. Cal. 1968); E.

TimBER.AKE, FEmR.

TREB.E DAMAGE ANTITRusT

AcTioNs 352-63 (1965). But see Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 8, at 719-35; Izard & Miller,
supra note 8, passim.
14. See Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, 120-21 (1979) (statements
of Thomas R. Long and Don T. Hibner, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; C. BANE,

Tim

ELECTRiCAL EquIPmENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE DAMAGE AcTIONS

381-83 (1973); Hoff-

man, Proof of Damages in Private Litigation, 36 A.B.A. ANTrIRUST L.J. 151, 167 (1967). Only 157
treble damage actions were recorded in the years 1899-1939, with only 14 recoveries by plaintiffs,
totalling less than $275,000. From 1940 to 1963, there were only 57 recoveries in the 1539 non682 (rev. ed. 1978); Guilfoil,
electrical equipment treble damage actions. ANTrrmuST ADMVISOR
PrivateEnforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 ANTrrmuST BuLL. 747, 750 (1965).
15. "In fiscal year 1978 private parties commenced 1,435 antitrust suits, while the United
States instituted only 72." Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
16. FED. R. Cwv. P. 23.
17. Pollack, Introductory Remarks, 41 A.B.A. ANTrrrusT L.J. 230 (1972). See generally
S. RnP. No. 428, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 428]. It should
be noted that, when the Sherman Act was passed, there was no class action rule. It is unlikely
that the Congress of 1890 ever contemplated the impact of treble damage recoveries on a
classwide basis.
18. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1166 n.24 (5th Cir. 1979);
Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp. 832, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Washington
v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-07 (S.D. Cal. 1968). According to the
Washington court, damages could be recovered for the sales of non-conspirators if plaintiffs
could prove that the "conspiracy raised the general price level in the market, and that nonconspirators sold their product under this umbrella at higher prices than would have prevailed absent the illegal activity." Id. at 805. Contra, Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental
Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580-87 (3d Cir. 1979).

19. 15 US.C. § 15b (1976).
20. See, e.g., Kansas City, Missouri v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1963). The statute of limitations may also be tolled by reason of a
prior, related government action, 15 U.S.C. § 16(i)(1976), or for other reasons, e.g., Mt. Hood
Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. ff 63,206 (9th Cir. 1980).
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periods in antitrust cases potentially extend over many years. 2 1 With class-wide
liability, compounded by the parens patriaeprovisions of the Clayton Act22 and
23
the increasing involvement in antitrust damage cases by state attorneys-general,
liability in many cases for just single damages would be enormous. Yet damages
in private antitrust actions are trebled and defendants are also liable for the
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.2 4 Consequently, the potential liability facing many
antitrust defendants is truly staggering. A case in point is the Plywood Antitrust
Litigation,25 in which a jury recently rendered a verdict approving a damage
formula which, if upheld, could result in the imposition of "the first $1 billion
judgment in history" against the three defendants that chose not to settle.26
The Plywood verdict made it graphically clear to antitrust litigants that, even
for an innocent defendant, the downside risk of trying a treble damage action
is so great that the case frequently must be settled, even at an otherwise un27
realistic price.
Existing rules against contribution further magnify the impact of treble
damage liability, as illustrated by the following hypothetical:
Class plaintiffs sue 20 defendants for price-fixing, alleging a cumulative
overcharge of $1 billion. Nineteen defendants, with a total of 95 percent
of industry sales, settle for an aggregate $300 million. The remaining
defendant, believing in its innocence, goes to trial and loses. The
damages proved are $3 billion - $1 billion, trebled. Of this total, the
remaining defendant can deduct only the $300 million recovered by
of $2.7 billion for a
plaintiffs in settlement, leaving an actual liability
2
defendant with just five percent of industry sales.
In this hypothetical, the sales of the 19 settling defendants were not deducted
from the plaintiffs' damage claims even though the plaintiffs obtained $300
million in settlement of those claims. Had there been a rule of contribution
requiring deduction of the settling defendants' sales, the non-settling de21. For example, in Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 495-502
(1968), the damage period was 16 years.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976).
23. See, e.g., 861 ANTrRUST & TRADE REc. REP. (BNA) D-1, D-2 (April 27, 1978).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
25. 1979-1 Trade Cas. § 62,459 (E.D. La. 1978).
26. Beckwith, Plywood Antitrust Case: Study in Streamlining,Legal Times of Washington,
November 27, 1978, at 1. Others have estimated that the damages may exceed $1.5 billion.
See S. REP'. No. 428, supra note 17, at 11.
27. See Lempert, Panic Aided Record Box Settlements, Legal Times of Washington, May
7, 1979, at 1, 4. When the Federal Trade Commission considered the Plywood matter, it found
only an "unfair method of competition," not a price-fixing conspiracy; even this limited ruling
was reversed on appeal. Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 102 (1978), revd, 1980-2 Trade Cas.
f, 63,323 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the trial attorney for the plaintiffs in the treble damage
action offered to settle the case - during the trial - for a total of $8 million.
28. Under the rule of Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957), damages are trebled before amounts recovered in settlement are
deducted. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971);
Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 533 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
The hypothetical described above is illustrated in cartoon form in Senate Hearings, supra
note 14, at 204-06.
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fendant's liability would have been $150 million 29 - a considerable sum indeed,

but not nearly so devastating as $2.7 billion.
The genuine threat of massive damage liability, vividly illustrated by the
Plywood verdict and magnified by existing rules forbidding contribution,
resulted in what have been aptly described as "coerced" settlements- in the
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation.-1 The Corrugated settlements,
announced shortly after the Eighth Circuit's ProfessionalBeauty decision, have
32
in turn sparked the recent widespread interest in the contribution question.

-

The Corrugatedlitigation had its genesis in a grand jury investigation that
resulted in indictments of 14 companies and 26 individuals for price-fixing. 33
As a result of the investigation, some 40 class actions were brought naming 37
companies as defendants. The first settling defendant paid $500,000 per percentage point of its market share to the plaintiffs. The second settling defendant,
which had the industry's second largest market share, 8.3 percent, paid $1 million per point, and the proportionate rate to remaining defendants escalated
considerably. By March 1979, about 20 defendants had settled for amounts as
high as $6.5 million per point. One small, unindicted, defendant was forced to
settle for $3.25 million per point - $5.6 million - while vigorously asserting its
innocence. This defendant had to settle because the earlier settlements had dramatically heightened its potential liability: several of the defendants had settled
for relatively smaller sums, relieving them of any further liability but leaving
their sales still in the case as a basis for damages. The small defendant, at the
time it settled, believed that it was facing a potential $5 billion liability, not to
mention considerable litigation expenses if it went to trial. 3 4 Some other unin-'
dicted defendants settled for amounts as high as $4 million per point. Another
defendant was acquitted in the Justice Department's criminal action, but paid
$27.4 million in settlement, $6.5 million per point, again due to the in terrorem
effect of its potential liability for three times the entire industry's damages.r
Although the Corrugated settlements are the most widely-publicized examples of coerced settlements, Corrugatedis far from an isolated case, 0 and
the contribution question is potentially present in all Sherman Act conspiracy
cases. In every case in which joint conduct is involved, each alleged conspirator
29. In the hypothetical, the same result would be obtained under a system of pro rata
contribution. See text accompanying notes 182-95 infra.
50.
31.

Senate Hearings,supranote 14, at 35; see Lempert, supra note 27, at 1, 4.
1979-1 Trade Cas. ff 62,690 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
82. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 14-16; Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at
32-48, 126-86, 155-71, 179-84, 188-94, 201, 207-09; Lempert, supra note 8, at 1, 4.

88. United States v. International Paper Co., [1978-79 Transfer Binder] 4 TRADE REo.
REP. (CCI-I) 9 45,078 (1978) (Case nos. 2621-22). Many of the defendants pleaded nolo
contendere; those that did not, however, were acquitted in the criminal trial.
34. S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 14-16; Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 84,
Westvaco Corp.- v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 8813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972).
The amounts obtained in the various settlements and the defendants' market shares are set
forth in Senate Hearings,supra note 14, at 181-84.
35. Lempert, supranote 27, at 1.
36. See, e.g., S. RE. No. 428, supra note 17, at 16; Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at
71-72, 121 (statements of Robert P. Taylor and Don T. Hibner, Jr.).
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may be severally liable for the entire amount of the joint liability. The problem
is a recurring one.
This article will analyze the decisional law of contribution in antitrust cases,
the various arguments for and against antitrust contribution, and the two
major legislative proposals.3 7 The primary conclusion drawn from this analysis
is that contribution should be permitted in antitrust cases. Contribution should
not be permitted, however, against defendants that have settled. Rather, settlements should result in reduction of the plaintiff's claim by the amount of the
settling defendant's contributive share. Contribution need not unduly complicate antitrust cases as its opponents fear; procedural rules can be formulated
to permit both contribution and claim reduction with minimal disruption to
the judicial system while still furthering the goals of the antitrust laws.
THE CASE LAW

The Experience in Non-Antitrust Cases
The first case to consider the contribution issue was Merryweather v.
Nixan3s a conversion action in which the King's Bench, per Lord Kenyon,
refused to allow a joint judgment defendant, who had satisfied the plaintiff's
entire claim, to obtain "contribution of a moiety" from his co-defendant. The
basis of the ruling was the doctrine that no man should be allowed to base an
action on his own intentional wrong.3 9
The subsequent development of the rule was noted in a comment to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
When, in the United States, the codes of civil procedure and modified
common law procedure permitted joinder of defendants who were
merely negligent, the defendants came to be called "joint tortfeasors"
and the reason for the rule against contribution was lost to sight. For a
long time the great majority of the American jurisdictions adopted a
fixed rule that there could be no contribution between those who were
liable in tort for the same harm, even when it was negligently inflicted.
This was gradually modified, in a number of states, to permit contribution in favor of a tortfeasor who was not personally at fault, as in the
case of a master held vicariously liable for the tort of his servant.4 0
In 1905, during the reign of Swift v. Tyson,4 1 the United States Supreme
37. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text, supra.
38. 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
39. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971). The origin of the rule forbidding
the maintenance of an action founded on one's own deliberate wrong was the Highwayman's
Case. Everet v. Williams, 9 L.Q. Rev. 197 (Ex. 1725). As described by Prosser: "This was a suit
by one highwayman against another for an accounting of their plunder. The bill was dismissed with costs to be paid by the defendant; the plaintiff's solicitors were attached and
fined fifty pounds each for contempt. Both plaintiff and defendant were hanged. In short,
contribution was not allowed." W. PROSSER, supra, at 305 n.40.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comment a, at 337-38 (1977); see Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
41. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Court adopted the modified Merryweatherrule in a diversity case, Union Stock
Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. r C.R. Co.42 Blurring the distinction between indemnity and contribution, 4 3 Justice Day's opinion recognized an exception to
the general rule against contribution. The exception provided that the law
will fasten "the ultimate liability upon the one whose wrong has been primarily responsible for the injury sustained"; 44 but where the parties' conduct
45
was "of the same character," there could be no indemnity or contribution.
The high-water mark for the rule against contribution was reached in a
1952 admiralty decision. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp.46 was a non-collision case 47 in which an employee of Haenn sustained
injuries while repairing a Halcyon vessel. Under applicable workmen's compensation legislation, the employee could not sue Haenn directly. He therefore
sued Halcyon, which then impleaded Haenn. Justice Black held that Halcyon's
third-party complaint should have been dismissed:
In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create
an enforceable right of contribution as between joint tortfeasors. This
judicial attitude has provoked protest on the ground that it is inequitable to compel one tortfeasor to bear the entire burden of a loss
which has been caused in part by the negligence of someone else. Others
have defended the policy of common-law courts in refusing to fashion
rules of contribution. To some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in
maritime affairs have felt freer than common-law courts in fashioning
rules, and we would feel free to do so here if wholly convinced that it
would best serve the ends of justice.
We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion
42. 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
43. The concepts of indemnification and contribution are analytically distinct. "Indemnification, unlike contribution, permits a wxongdoer to escape loss by shifting his entire
responsibility to another party." Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1979); see Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 718-19
(2d Cir. 1978). Despite the conflict in the circuits on the question of contribution, the courts
have agreed - and properly so - that indemnification may not be obtained in antitrust cases.
E.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. if 62,995, at 79,704-05 (10th
Cir. 1979), rehearingen banc granted, (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979); Professional Beauty Supply,
Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1186-87. But ef. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409.
F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969) (corporation entitled to indemnification from its own officials who
caused it to commit an antitrust violation).
44. 196 U.S. at 227. Several other cases have recognized a distinction between "active" and
"passive" negligence. E.g., Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 915 (1951). But cf. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) (overruling this distinction and adopting for New York a rule of apportionment of damages based on comparative fault).
45. 196 U.S. at 228. The Court left open the question whether contribution is available
when both defendants are sued jointly. Id. at 223; see Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
46. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
47. In collision cases, admiralty has permitted the division of damages for over 800
years, going back to the Laws of Oleron, art. XIV (c. 1150). See 4 R. MARSDEN, BrrsH
SHIPPING LAws 140-41 (11th ed. 1961). See also Exodus 21:35.
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new judicial rules of contribution 48and that the solution of this problem
should await congressional action.

Halcyon appeared to stand for a broad rule against contribution in the
absence of legislation. But Halcyon has not endured. Its reach was sharply
circumscribed by a unanimous Supreme Court in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc.,49 a 1974 admiralty decision which limited Halcyon to its
facts. In Cooper, a longshoreman fell and injured his back when he stepped
into a gap between palletized crates concealed by corrugated paper. The
stevedoring company, Cooper, had loaded the crates while the vessel was docked
at another port. The longshoreman sued the vessel, which filed a third-party
complaint against Cooper. Unlike the situation in Halcyon, Cooper would not
have been immune from a direct suit by the plaintiff since the plaintiff was not
a Cooper employee. The Supreme Court held that Halcyon applies only when
the party from whom contribution is sought is immune from suit. Justice
Marshall's opinion emphasized the benefits of a rule favoring contribution:
The interests of safety dictate that where two parties "are both in
fault, they should bear the damage equally, to make them more careful." .. . And a "more equal distribution of justice" can best be achieved

by ameliorating the common-law rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one of two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss,
though the other may have been equally or more to blame. 50
As the Court noted in Cooper, admiralty courts have been more liberal than
common law courts in fashioning contribution rules However, the common
law courts have also expressed dissatisfaction with the Merryweather rule, and
modern cases have far more often than not allowed contribution. By the time
of the Halcyon decision, nine American jurisdictions had already judicially
abandoned the rule against contribution in negligence cases.5 2- For example, in
George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co.,5s the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals held that the rule barring contribution in all cases "is not sustainable upon any fair basis of reasoning, is wrong, and should be overruled.- 5 4 As
of 1978, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act 5 had been
adopted in 19 states, and 18 other states had adopted other legislation also
overruling the common law rule against contribution.56 By 1979, the Supreme
Court was able to say that the general rule is that concurrent tortfeasors are

48. 342 U.S. at 285 (footnotes omitted).
49. 417 U.S. 106 (1974). Justice Stewart did not participate in the decision.
50. Id. at 111, quoting The Alabama, 92 U.S. 695, 697 (1876) and The Max Morris, 137
U.S. 1, 14 (1890).
51. 417 U.S. at 110.
52. The cases are collected in W. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 306-07 nn.48-56.
53. 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
54.

Id. at 220.

55. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACr (1939) (revised 1955).
56. The various statutes are collected in S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 12.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss2/2

8

Jacobson: Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary Solution to
1980]

CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST DEFENDANTS

entitled to contribution Even in England, the Merryweather rule has been
overruled by statute. 8
Many of the jurisdictions that abandoned the common law rule have permitted contribution only for those not guilty of intentional torts. 59 Those
jurisdictions have adhered to the underlying rationale of Merryweather "that
the courts will not aid one who had deliberately done harm, so that no man
can be permitted to found a cause of action on his own intentional tort."60
Other jurisdictions, however, have permitted contribution even for intentional
tortfeasors. 61 The latter seems to be the better view because a cause of action
for contribution is not based on one's own wrong. It is essentially an action in
quasi-contract, based upon the payment to the plaintiff of more than one's
share of the judgment.62
Recent federal court decisions tend to allow contribution, even for intentional torts. For example, several courts 63 have permitted claims for contribution in anti-discrimination actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.64 Even
in complex fraud actions under the federal securities laws, the courts have
found an implied right to contribution.- Although certain provisions of the
securities laws expressly provide for contribution, 6 no express provision governs implied private actions under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 193467 and SEC rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder,68 violations of which
are intentional torts.69 As one court noted, it is "[b]ecause of the deterrent
policy of the securities laws" that even intentional tortfeasors can obtain
contribution in lOb-5 actions; in this way, it can be assured "that the other
70
tortfeasors will not escape liability."
57. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260-61 n.8 (1979);
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A & Comment a (1977).
58. The Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30.
59. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Younger v.
Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 797 (W.D. Va. 1976) (Virginia law), vacated,
561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977); UNIFORMa CONTRIBUTON AMONG JoNrr TORTFEAsORS Acr § 1(c)
(1955).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comment j (1977).
61. See, e.g., Judson v. People Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 91, 110 A.2d 24, 36 (1954);
Primoff v. Duell, 85 Misc. 2d 1047, 1051, 381 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
62. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262, 201 N.W.2d
758 (1972).
63. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 73 F.R.D. 57, 59 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 89-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 797
(W.D. Va. 1976) (applying Virginia law, under which there is no contribution for intentional
tortfeasors), vacated, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976).
65. The leading case is Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Servs., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78i(e), 78r(b) (1976).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
69. Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
70. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238
REsrATEMENT
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Antitrust ContributionDecisions
The Choice of Law Problem
The initial question arising in antitrust contribution cases is whether to
apply state or federal law. The courts have never given this question the attention it merits although they have almost invariably reached the correct result federal law applies.71 As the Supreme Court held in Sola Electric Co. v.
Jefferson Electric Co.:

72

When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and
nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the
statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the
answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy
which it has adopted. To the federal statute and policy, conflicting state
3
law and policy must yield.7
Courts have usually assumed that this statement provides the complete answer
to the question. Properly viewed, however, Sola states only the first part of a
two-stage analysis. Whether contribution is available in antitrust cases is indeed
a federal question, but the federal question itself may be resolved either by
formulating a uniform federal common law rule or by allowing state rules to
apply.7 4 For example, prior to the 1955 enactment of a uniform statute of
limitations in federal antitrust cases, 75 the statute of the forum state applied.6
Because antitrust cases frequently involve a multiplicity of both plaintiffs
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Accord, Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1979); Odette v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
1976). See generally Fischer, Contribution in lOb-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1821 (1978).
71. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 1 61,698, at 79,700 n.5
(10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979); Wilson P. Abraham
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. January 24, 1980)
(No. 79-1144); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1182 n.3; Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960) (dictum); El Camino
Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. ff 61,533, at 72,000 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
But see Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d 616, 619 (4th Cir. 1956).
(dictum).
72. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
73. Id. at 176.
74. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Royal Indem.
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S. 489
(1916); P. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed.
1973); Friendly, In Praise of Erie- And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rzv.
383, 410 (1964); Note, The Role of State Law in Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 75
HARV. L. REv. 1395 (1962). Compare, e.g., Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522
F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1975) with Stella v. Kaiser, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US.
835 (1955).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) (original version at ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 283 (1955)).
76. E.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397-99 (1906);
Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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and defendants - frequently from many different states - a uniform federal
common law rule should govern the contribution question. State contribution
laws vary markedly and reference to state law would result in considerable
confusion and continuous forum shopping.77 Particularly in light of the many
significant antitrust cases that become multidistrict proceedings, it seems
especially appropriate to have a uniform federal rule of contribution.78
The Question of Contribution
Apart from conflicting dicta in two circuit court decisions, 7 9 no court ever
addressed the question of contribution in antitrust cases until 1969 in Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd.80 The Sabre Shipping court
ordered dismissal of a third-party complaint filed against 14 settling defendants
by a number of nonsettling defendants. Judge Ryan's opinion relied primarily
on Halcyon and Union Stock Yards and, because of the absence of legislation,
presumed a congressional intent to preclude contribution. The court also
expressed the view that allowing the settling defendants to be brought back
into the case would discourage settlements and take control of the action out of
the plaintiff's hands81
The contribution question was not addressed in a reported case, apart from
more conflicting dicta, for another seven years.8 2 The 1976 case of El Camino
Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co. s 3 involved an effort by the defendants to implead the
president and co-owner of the plaintiff in a related case. The court acknowledged that the arguments for contribution in favor of unintentional violators
were persuasive, but dismissed the third-party complaint nevertheless, reasoning
that "intent [should] remain irrelevant to an antitrust action."8 14 Additionally,
the court "believe[d] that the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws may be increased by not permitting defendants to redistribute the cost of an antitrust
violation."8 5

77. See Response in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 3 n.4, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams
Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972).
78. See Corbett, supra note 5, at 123-28; Sellers, supra note 8, at 833-43; cf. Fischer, supra
note 70, at 1827-29 (advocating uniform federal rule of contribution in securities cases).
A separate question is whether to permit the assertion of state law claims for contribution
either in state court or in federal court under pendent or diversity jurisdiction. If such claims
were allowed, any uniformity in the federal law of contribution would be destroyed. Accordingly, state contribution laws should not apply to claims arising out of liability under the
federal antitrust laws. See Corbett, supra note 5, at 136; cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284
(1972) (holding state antitrust laws inapplicable to the business of baseball).
79. See note 3 supra.
80. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

81. Id. at 1346.
82. See note 4 supra. An unreported 1974 order denied contribution. Labbee v. William
Wrigley Co., No. 74-4029 (W.D. Wash. December 20, 1974).
83. 1977-1 Trade Cas. fI 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
84. Id. at 72,112.
85. Id. The court also relied on the policy against taking control of the action from the
plaintiff, commenting that severance of the third-party complaint was "an uncertain and
inadequate remedy." Id.
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The third reported ruling on contribution in antitrust cases was Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.s6 in 1977. In a prior case brought by 14 egg
producers, Olson and several other egg buyers were alleged to have conspired
to depress the price of eggs, yet Olson was the sole defendant named in the
suit.87 Only $99,656 of the damages was attributable to Olson's purchases and
only eleven percent of plaintiffs' sales was made to Olson. Nevertheless, Olson
was compelled to satisfy the plaintiffs' entire judgment, which exceeded $2.4
million, representing treble damages for the conduct of all the egg buyers, plus
attorneys' fees, costs and interest.88 None of the other conspirators had to pay a
dime. The brief opinion denying Olson's claim for contribution offered no
insight into the district court's reasoning.
The next reported decision was Professional Beauty."9 This was a dealer
termination case brought only against National, the dealer that had been substituted for the plaintiff. The supplier and alleged coconspirator, La Maur,
was not sued - apparently because it was persuaded to renew the plaintiff's
franchise. The district court dismissed National's third-party complaint against
La Maur and National appealed. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The majority
opinion noted that, in light of Cooper, the reliance on Halcyon in prior decisions had been misplaced and that the federal courts could indeed fashion
rules of contribution in the absence of congressional direction."0 As to whether
the policy of deterrence is served best by prohibiting contribution, the court
concluded that "the question of deterrence actually cuts both ways and on
balance a rule allowing contribution is actually a greater deterrent" because it
prevents additional antitrust violators from escaping liability entirely.91 The
court also pointed out that proper case management by the district courts
would alleviate any additional complications that contribution might cause.
The court held that the overriding consideration was "fairness between the
parties," which required a rule allowing contribution, "at least under certain
circumstances."92
86. 1977-2 Trade Cas. IT61,698 (D. Utah 1977), afj'd, 1979-2 Trade Cas. ff 62,995 (10th
Cir. 1979), rehearingen banc granted, (10th Cir. December 27, 1979). An unreported decision,
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D. La. October 5,
1977), aff'd, 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. January 24, 1980) (No. 79-1144), denied contribution three weeks prior to the Olson Farms decision.
87. Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
88. 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 79,700 & n.3.
89. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). Prior to Professional Beauty, another district court
denied a claim for contribution in an unreported decision. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v.
Spencer Foods, Inc., M.D.L. No. 248 (N.D. Tex. September 1, 1978), aff'd sub nom. In re
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass'n, 48 U.S.L.W. 3538 (U.S. February
6, 1980) (No. 79-1214).
90. 594 F.2d at 1183.
91. Id. at 1184-85.
92. Id. at 1185. The court did "not hold that contribution is available to all violators of
the antitrust laws, regardless of the flagrancy of the conduct of the party seeking contribution."
Rather, the decision to allow or deny contribution should be based on "all the circumstances
of the case.... Id. at 1186.
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The first reported decision- s to consider Professional Beauty was In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,04 where the district court denied leave to assert
a claim for contribution against two settling defendants. The opinion distinguished ProfessionalBeauty on the ground that it did not concern contribu-

tion against settling defendants, and adhered to Sabre Shipping, Olson Farms

and El Camino Glass.95
The next case was Corrugated.There the court aclkowledged that, because

of the "coercive impact" of the rule against contribution, "[e]ven a defendant
relatively certain of a judgment in his favor must have serious doubts about

risking such- exposure by going to trial,"96 but nevertheless denied the nonsettling defendants' motions to assert claims for contribution against the

settling defendants. The court reasoned that, with respect to intentional torts,
deterrence would be better furthered by a rule against contribution.. More

importantly, in the court's view, "a policy of allowing contribution .would
complicate litigation procedurally, frustrate settlements and inhibit joint
defense efforts ... P97 After Corrugated, a Pennsylvania district court ruled
against contribution in Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc.,98 in a

curt pretrial order. 99
In October 1979, the Fifth Circuit became the second appellate court to
consider the contribution question. In Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp.

v. Texas Industries,Inc.,100 a divided panel held that no right of contribution
was available. In this case, Abraham had sued Texas Industries for price fixing,
alleging a conspiracy between it and certain unnamed coconspirators. Discovery

District Judge Hanson dissented, arguing that contribution should not be allowed in favor
of intentional tortfeasors, particularly in light of "the potential for confusion, delay, and complexity inherent in permitting antitrust defendants to implead other antitrust violators ...."
Id. at 1190 (Hanson, J. dissenting). It is, perhaps, the fear of such complications that explains
why every district judge who has considered the question has refused to permit the assertion
of claims for contribution in antitrust cases.
93. After Professional Beauty, claims for contribution were disallowed in two unreported
cases. In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 201A (E.D. Pa. April 2, 1979); In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 250 (N.M. Ill. March 30, 1979). In the Sugar
case, defendant Armstar Corp.'s motion for leave to amend its answer was denied as untimely,
see In re Cessna Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1976); no view on
the merits was expressed.
94. 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.G. 1979).
95. Id. at 650.
96. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 1979-1 Trade Cas. at 77,879.
97. Id. at 77,879-80.
98. 1979-1 Trade, Cas. ff62,717 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
99. Subsequent to Hedges, another judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
a motion filed by various settling defendants to dismiss claims for contribution that had been
asserted against them., In the court's view, contribution would unfairly upset existing settlements and "would also inhibit further settlements from among the remaining defendants."
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 323, at 3 (E.D. Pa. August 3, 1979) (unreported). Contribution against settling defendants was also denied in Alabama v. Blue Bird
Body Co., No. 75-23-N (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979) (unreported), appeal docketed, No. 79-2667

(5th Cir. July 26, 1979).
100. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). Petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc were
denied on November 29, 1979. A petition for certiorari was filed January 24, 1980. Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. January 24, 1980) (No. 79-1144).
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revealed the names of the coconspirators and Texas Industries filed a thirdparty complaint against them. The district court dismissed the third-party
complaint and, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The majority opinion
made it clear that Congress' failure to legislate a right of contribution did not
give rise to the presumption that it intended to deny one. 10 1 Rather, the court's
decision was premised on its view that a rule against contribution operates as
the more effective deterrent and that the arguments advanced by Texas Industries were insufficient "to discard an established rule of law ....,102 Dissenting in part, one judge urged recognition of a right to contribution for unintentional violators, pointing out that deterrence is less relevant to unintentional
103

torts.

As of this writing, the most recent decision on the question is Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,'0 4 in which a Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the Utah
district court decision discussed above.'0 5 Acknowledging the "strong, offsetting
arguments over the contribution issue," the court concluded that it "should
await a clear signal, at least, from the legislative branch" prior to creating the
procedural complications that might arise if a right to contribution were allowed. However, the court "recogniz[ed] a possible exception in the case of an
unintentional violator ....
".106Judge Holloway dissented, saying that "the
result of imposing the entire treble damages liability on one defendant while
denying him any right to seek contribution from others jointly involved in the
10 7
wrong, is too extreme for me."'
The conflict in the cases will soon be resolved. On June 16, 1980, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Corrugated case, and will apparently
decide once and for all whether contribution should be permitted in antitrust
cases.108
THE POLICY

Arguments Against Contribution
The arguments advanced against contribution can be grouped into five
101. 604 F.2d at 900.
102. Id. at 903, 906.
103. Id. at 907 (Morgan, J., dissenting). The majority rejected this approach, primarily
on the ground that the additional complexities resulting from contribution could have a
"chilling effect" on plaintiffs' incentives to maintain antitrust suits. Id. at 905-06, citing
Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1190 (Hanson,
J., dissenting).
Two additional Fifth Circuit panels have ruled against contribution, citing Abraham
Construction as controlling. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167, 183 (5th
Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass'n, 48 U.S.L.W. 3538 (U.S. February 6, 1980) (No. 79-1214); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco
Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972).
104. 1979-2 Trade Cas. T62,995 (10th Cir. 1979).
105. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
106. 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 79,703-04.
107. Id. at 79,707 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
108. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No.
79-972).
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broad categories: (1) that the courts should await congressional action rather
than abandon the common law rule; (2) that contribution should at least be
denied to intentional violators; (3) that preclusion of contribution better serves
to deter antitrust violations; (4) that contribution would seriously complicate
already complex antitrust litigation and might deter private treble damage
suits; and (5) that contribution would discourage settlements.
Legislative Solution Preferable
Probably the least substantial of the arguments against contribution is that
the courts should not abandon the common law rule but, rather, should wait
for Congress to act. 109 The rule that the common law governs in the absence of
legislation is based on presumed congressional intent.110 However, it has always
been the judiciary's function to fill in the interstices of federal statutory
schemes. "Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on
an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives."- 1 Therefore, as the Abraham
Construction court acknowledged, the lack of congressional action does not
indicate any intent to deny contribution under the antitrust laws: "It is more
likely that this narrow question, although a matter of some importance, never
occurred to the drafters of the legislation. Our task, therefore, is to guess what
Congress 'would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point
had been present.' "112 Particularly with respect to the antitrust laws, where the
"courts have not been prone to await congressional action to resolve many of
the questions left unanswered by these statutes,""13 outdated common law rules
should not be allowed to prevail over common justice."-4
A closely related argument for retaining existing rules against contribution
in the absence of legislation lies in the doctrine of stare decisis. Because blind
adherence to precedent can produce extremely inequitable results,"5 stare
decisis should prevail against strong competing considerations only where those
109. This argument is presented, for example, in Brief of Respondents-Plaintiffs Opposing
Certiorari, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 8813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No.
79-972).
110. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339,
1345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
111. P. HA.T &H. WkECHSLE, supra note 74, at 470-71.
112, 604 F.2d at 900-01, quoting B. CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICAL PROCFSS 15
(1949); accord, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at
1183-84.
113. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1183.
See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933) (antitrust laws have a
"generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions').

114. Corbett, supra note 5, at 180; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
401 U.S. 321, 346 (1971). In Zenith, the Court abandoned the common law rule that a release
extinguishes a cause of action even as against nonparties to the release and held that, in
antitrust cases, the intent of the parties to the release should govern. See also Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) (common law in pari
delicto defense held inapplicable in federal antitrust cases).
115. Compare Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) with Radovitch v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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who would be affected by a different rule have relied on the existing rule to
their detriment.116 In the absence of detrimental reliance, courts should not
hesitate to correct obsolete rules.117 The only parties that may have acted in
reliance on existing prohibitions of contribution are plaintiffs and defendants
that have negotiated settlements in pending cases. There should be no contribution against settling defendants in any event. 1 s With respect to plaintiffs,
most settlement agreements in pending cases are likely to have considered the
possibility that the courts would allow contribution. 11 9 For the rare plaintiff
that would be unfairly prejudiced by retroactive application of a decision permitting contribution, such a rule might be applied only prospectively." 2° As to
future cases, however, there can be no prospective detrimental reliance and
stare decisis considerations should be disregarded altogether.
Congressional action, although probably desirable, should not be awaited.
The legislation currently pending in Congress leaves to the courts the development of appropriate rules concerning contribution in all cases not involving
price-fixing. 121 Further, experience with the statutory scheme in admiralty
demonstrates that a statutory solution alone can never resolve all the issues
involved, but rather frequently creates as many questions as it answers.122 The
most persuasive fact is that the unfairness caused by the existing no-contribution
rule persists now. Legislative change takes time and sometimes never comes.
The courts should not stand idly by while an injustice of their own creation
continues to wreak further havoc.
Intentional Tortfeasors
It has been suggested that if the rule foreclosing contribution is to be
abandoned, it only be for unintentional torts, i.e., that the courts retreat to the
original common law rule prohibiting intentional tortfeasors from obtaining
contribution.12- While this view has some appeal, it has serious drawbacks.
Intent is not an essential element of an antitrust violation. Rather, "in a
civil action under the Sherman Act, liability may be established by proof of
either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.'124 If proof or disproof
of an unlawful intent were required in antitrust cases, an unwarranted additional complexity would be introduced.125 Corporate intent is frequently very

116.

See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

117. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970).

118.

See text accompanying notes 148-167 infra.

119.

See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 1980-1 Trade Cas. fi 63,163, at

77,790 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
120.

See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).

121. S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 12.
122. See generally Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
123.

See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d at 906-07

(dissenting opinion); S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 35-36 (supplemental views).
124.

McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 100 S. Ct. 502, 509 (1980) (emphasis in original).

125. E.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. at 72,112.
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difficult to establish, 2 6 and the formulation of rules to decide what kind of
intent bars contribution and what kind does not would be equally difficult.
More fundamentally, no distinction based on intent is relevant to the basic
reason why contribution should be permitted, i.e., fairness. Olson Farms, for
example, may have had a thoroughly evil intent when it agreed with Safeway
and its other coconspirators to reduce the price of the eggs they bought. But is
it fair to compel Olson Farms to pay three times the damage caused by the
entire conspiracy when it was responsible for only eleven percent? Clearly not.
Neither Olson Farms' intent nor Safeway's is relevant to the question of fairness. With increasing frequency, the courts that have abandoned the common
law rule against contribution in non-antitrust cases have done so even for
intentional torts. 27 The reasons advanced for reversing that trend in antitrust
cases are not persuasive

28

Deterrence
One of the primary arguments against contribution is that it would detract,
from the deterrent purpose of the treble damage remedy - that the threat of

being forced to pay three times the damages caused by the entire conspiracy is
the most effective deterrent to those contemplating business behavior of dubious
antitrust legality. 129 As the Eighth Circuit noted in ProfessionalBeauty, however, "the question of deterrence actually cuts both ways .... ,3"30It has been
pointed out that:
The absence of contribution can operate to the advantage of equally
guilty conspirators by permitting them to go "scot-free." What the punitive burden loses in terms of the risk of its concentration on a few larger
coconspirators, it would certainly gain through diffusion over a larger
number of violators. Not only would the existence of rights of contribution remove to a great extent the possibility of escaping liability entirely, ... [it would also] add vigor to the enforcement of the antitrust
laws by allowing the conspirators themselves to ensure that all those
participating in the unlawful action are appropriately penalized.'8'
Similar considerations were expressed by the Supreme Court in Perma Life

Mufflers Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp.,32 which substantially curtailed the
application of the in pari delicto defense in antitrust cases. The Court noted
that a plaintiff that has participated, in a conspiracy "may be no less morally
reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further
the overriding public policy in favor of competition." 33 Courts in admiralty34
126. See, e.g., Corbett, supranote 5, at 132-34.
127. See text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
128. See Section Proposal,supra note 10, at E-2.
129. E.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d at 901.
130. 594 F.2d at 1185.
131. Corbett, supra note 5, at 137; see Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1185 (the "possibility of escaping all liability- might cause
many to be more willing... to engage in wrongful activity').
132. 392 U.S. 184 (1968).
133. Id. at 139.
134. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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and securitiesl35 cases have also expressed the view that the cause of deterrence
is better served by assuring that all guilty parties will be made to account.
Even if to some extent the policy of deterrence is better served by denying
contribution, the potential for over-deterrence should also be recognized. Even
with contribution, treble damage exposure in class action litigation is a substantial deterrentl 36 And the best deterrent of all, the very real threat of jail
terms for price-fixers and other defendants as a result of stepped-up Justice
Department criminal enforcement efforts,"s 7 is in no way affected by contribu-

tion. On the other hand, as the Supreme Court pointed out in United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 38 "the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act
is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and
economically justifiable business conduct."139 The Court noted that the antitrust laws are statutes of strict liability and said that "where the conduct proscribed is difficult to distinguish from conduct permitted and indeed encouraged ....

the excessive caution spawned by a regime of strict liability will

not necessarily redound to the public's benefit."140 Thus, the rule against contribution can in some cases over-penalize arguably pro-competitive conduct.
The potential for over-deterrence would seem to be especially acute in maximum price-fixing cases and in buyer-conspiracy price-fixing cases, such as
Olson Farms, where the effect of the violation may well be to lower prices to
consumers.
Although deterrence is a primary concern underlying the treble damage
remedy, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to ascertain whether deterrence
militates in favor or against contribution. For that reason, the deterrence factor
should not be dispositive either way.
Complexity
An often-expressed fear is that contribution would further complicate antitrust litigation, making it more difficult for the courts to manage and discouraging plaintiffs from maintaining suits. As then-Assistant Attorney General John
Shenefield put it:
Contribution may present a real risk of increasing the complexity of
private antitrust litigation. Defendants joined as parties to antitrust
litigation by other defendants for the purpose of determining contribution rights may also contest the plaintiff's right to relief; this situation
could expand discovery, distort the plaintiff's case, and possibly overwhelm the plaintiff by expanding the scope of the litigation.141
135. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
136. S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 18.
137. See Address by Sanford M. Litvack, New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Section, Annual Meeting (January 28, 1980).
138. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
139. Id. at 440-41.
140. Id. at 441-42 n.17.
141. Letter from John H. Shenefield to Howard M. Metzenbaum 2 (May 14, 1979); accord,
e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 1979-1 Trade Cas. at 77,879-80; Sabre
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These concerns are greatly exaggerated.
In the typical complex price-fixing class action, plaintiffs almost invariably join all conceivable parties, so there will be no additional parties for
the defendants to bring in. In Corrugated, for example, the government
indicted fourteen corporations; the class action plaintiffs sued thirty-seven. 142
Thus, "[s]ince it is common practice for an antitrust plaintiff to join as many
defendants as may reasonably be expected to be liable, with a view to ensuring
full recovery, it is difficult to see how this burden would be increased by permitting contribution."' 4 Additionally, efforts by defendants to complicate
litigation by impleading other alleged coconspirators can aid plaintiffs by
allowing damages to be recovered that would otherwise have avoided detection. Even those industry participants who somehow avoid being named
as defendants will usually be subjected to discovery. Thus contribution would
not expand discovery. More fundamentally, the prospect of treble damages plus
attorneys' fees and costs provides a tremendous incentive to sue, and the number of treble damage actions filed each year is enormous. 44 The likelihood that
contribution will deter the filing of treble damage actions is so small that it
can be disregarded altogether.
In the rare case where contribution has the potential to complicate the
action so as to jeopardize the plaintiff's chances for recovering, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure give the courts ample powers to prevent such a result.
Courts can require separate actions for contribution by denying permission to
implead1 45 and they can require severance and separate trials with respect to
the contribution claims. 46 Securities fraud cases, in which contribution is
permitted, are frequently as complex as antitrust cases, yet the courts have been
able to deal satisfactorily with the problems there,' 47 indicating that concerns
about further complicating antitrust litigation are insufficient to justify the
unfairness that exists when contribution is denied.
Discouraging Settlement
Opponents of contribution have charged that if contribution were allowed,
incentives to settle would be substantially reduced. They argue that allowing
contribution against defendants who have settled "would operate to prevent
[the plaintiff from] receiving prompt recovery since no defendant would settle
with him if he was [sic] to find himself back in the suit as a third party deShipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
see also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737-44 (1977).
142. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
143. Corbett, supranote 5, at 111, quoted in S. REP,. No. 428, supranote 17, at 20.
144. See note 15 supra.
145. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(b); Connell v. Bernstein-Macauley, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y.

1975).
146. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas.
at 79,706 (Holloway, J. dissenting); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty
Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1184; S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 20; Section Proposal,supra
note 10, at E-2.
147. See generally Fischer,supra note 70.
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fendant."'141 All the leading advocates of contribution in antitrust cases have
recognized the validity of this objection, and have agreed that contribution
should not be permitted against defendants who have settled in good faith.
Settlements are too important in private antitrust litigation to allow a rule that
would seriously deter them.149
The proponents and opponents of antitrust contribution differ most on
whether contribution should be accompanied by mandatory claim reduction,
as provided in both the proposed Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act reported by
the Senate Judiciary Committeel5 ° and the legislation proposed by the Section
of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association.151 Although there are many
different methods of mandatory claim reduction, the basic concept is a simple
one - that when a plaintiff settles with one defendant, the plaintiff's claim
against the remaining defendants is reduced prior to trebling by the amount of
damages attributable to the settling defendant. Under existing law, the remaining defendants are still liable for the damages attributable to the settling defendant, with a defense of payment only to the extent of the amount obtained
in settlement - after trebling. 5 2 In the view of contribution advocates, mandatory claim reduction is an essential aspect of any contribution proposal.
This provision is ...

essential to make a contribution statute work

fairly. The provision addresses the problem of innocent defendants facing increasingly larger liability claims as the more culpable defendants
settle. While we do not think it is sound policy to permit parties who go
to trial to claim contribution from settling parties, some mechanism is
needed to protect the remaining defendants from facing liability for a
plaintiff's claims against those with whom he has settled which exceed
the amount of the settlement. 53
The opposition to mandatory claim reduction is based primarily on a belief
that plaintiffs would not be willing to settle with one defendant for an amount
that would reduce the total amount of their recovery, and, thus, that settlements would be deterred. 54 It is also argued that mandatory claim reduction
148. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. at 1346; accord,
e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 323, at 3 (E.D. Pa. August 3, 1979);

Letter from John H. Shenefield, supra note 141, at 2.
149. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at
1184, and authorities there cited; S.

REP.

No. 428, supra note 17, at 24; Section Proposal,supra

note 10, at E-3; cf. Sellers, supra note 8. See also Luke v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 523 F.2d 1190
(5th Cir. 1975); Fischer, supra note 70, at 1831-36; Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1170, 1172-73 (1941).
150. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill was passed by a voice vote on July 31,

1979, 925 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4 (August 2, 1979), and was reported
November 27, 1979. S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17. No action has been scheduled in the
House of Representatives as of this writing.
151. Section Proposal,supra note 10.
152. See S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 21; notes 28-29 and accompanying text, supra.
153. Section Proposal,supra note 10, at E-4.
154. Hearings, supra note 14, at 110; Brief of Respondents-Plaintiffs Opposing Certiorari
at 6 n.3, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No.
79-972); see S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 36-40 (supplemental views).
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would effect a de facto elimination of joint and several liability.'r5 Neither
objection withstands analysis.
The argument that mandatory claim reduction will deter settlements is
belied by experience. In some antitrust cases, the defendants have entered into
"sharing agreements." These agreements typically obligate the defendants to
include in any settlement a provision reducing the plaintiff's recoverable
damages by an amount equal to the settling defendant's contributive share.
Plaintiffs and defendants have successfully negotiated such carve-out settlements
in major antitrust cases. 5 6 It is true that under mandatory claim reduction, a
settlement will reduce the plaintiff's ultimate recovery by the difference between
the settling defendant's contributive share and the amount of the settlement.
Yet the purpose of every settlement is to compromise the plaintiff's otherwise
uncertain claim in return for a reduced, but certain, payment. A settlement is
simply a sale of part of the plaintiff's damage claim.157
Mandatory claim reduction and similar provisions have worked successfully
in non-antitrust cases for many years. Some jurisdictions have adopted this
solution by statute, 58 others have done so by judicial decision, 59 and the courts
have not had any difficulty with it.10 The carve-out solution has not deterred
fair settlements,16 1 or eliminated joint and several liability62 Rather, claim
reduction is "consistent with the long-standing policy considerations underlying any system of contribution: the encouragement of voluntary settlements,
the equitable distribution of liability among joint tortfeasors, and the elimina'
tion or minimization of collusion." 63
Without mandatory claim reduction, there is no incentive for plaintiffs to
obtain a fair amount in settlement from those defendants that choose to settle
155. E.g., S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 36 (supplemental views); Lard & Miller,
supranote 8, at 22-23.
156. See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. II 63,059 (E.D.
Ark. 1979); In re Cement &:Concrete Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 296 (D. Ariz. July 31,
1979), discussed in 927 ArmusT & TADE REG. REaP. (BNA) A-1 (August 16, 1979); S. REP.
No. 428, supra note 17, 25; Hearings,supra note 14, at 121 (statement of Don T. Hibner, Jr.).
157. See Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
158. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBL. L. § 15-108(a) (McKinney 1978); see UNIFORM COMPARATIVE
FAULT Acr § 6 (1977).
159. E.g., Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394
F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1967); Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Judson v.
Peoples Bank &Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954) (Brennan, J.).
160. See, e.g., Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979); Kassman
v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1033 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Doyle v. United States, 441
F. Supp. 701, 710-13 &n.5 (D.S.C. 1977).
161. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 n.13 (1975) (discussing
comparative negligence experience).
162. The main purpose of joint and several liability is to assure that the plaintiff is able
to recover his judgment. E.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S.
256, 275 n.2 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet the plaintiff recovers his entire judgment
whether or not contribution is permitted. If a defendant, by reason of insolvency or unavailability, is unable to pay his contributive share, the loss is .borne by the codefendants,
who must make up the difference. See, e.g., Moody v. Bass, 357 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1966);
Judson v. Peoples Bank & Txust Co., 25 NJ. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957).
163. Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1967).
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early; plaintiffs can still collect treble their total damages from the defendants
that remain. As more and more defendants settle, those who remain face increasingly greater liability and are forced to abandon their defense, however
meritorious it may be. 6 4 Yet in the meantime, the plaintiffs have given up
nothing. Contribution with mandatory claim reduction will only deter inadequate settlements made early in a case. Such settlements often involve the
more culpable defendants, and escalate the potential liability for the defendants
that prefer to remain innocent until proven guilty.' 65 Fair settlements will not

be affected.
The ultimate answer to the argument that contribution will deter settlements was given by a unanimous Supreme Court in United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co.:"66

But even if this argument were more persuasive than it is, it could
hardly be accepted. For, at bottom, it asks us to continue the operation
of an archaic rule because its facile application out of court yields quick,
though inequitable, settlements, and relieves the courts of some litigation. Congestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces
unjust results in67 litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court accommodations.1

Reasons ContributionShould Be Allowed
The basic reason for recognizing a right of contribution in antitrust cases
is a simple one. The lack of contribution is quintessentially unfair. It is unfair
to allow plaintiffs to single out one defendant to satisfy the liability of many.
It is unfair to compel a single defendant to pay treble damages for an entire
industry's liability. And it is unfair to force a defendant to abandon its defense
and settle simply because of the coercive impact of earlier settlements with
more culpable parties. In its petition for certiorari in the Corrugated case,
Westvaco Corporation correctly argued that "coercion, intimidation and blackmail should never be countenanced. The right to trial may be rendered meaningless by a system which forces defendants to settle cases at exorbitant levels
without regard to the merits."'16 8
164.

As one witness testified in the hearings on S. 1468, his company's potential liability

was so large in relation to its net worth that its "borrowing power was voided .
Senate
Hearings,supra note 14, at 43-45 (statement of George Kress).
165. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 78 (statement of Donald G. Kempf).
According to some witnesses, discounted settlements can aid small defendants, for example,
those with large market shares in industries where much larger and financially able defendants
also compete. It is argued that such discounted settlements would not occur with mandatory
claim reduction based, for example, on market share. See, e.g., id. at 52-53 (testimony of David
Shapiro). Yet, as the committee report on S.1468 put it: "[T]his situation would seem to arise
very infrequently . . . and it was never made clear in any event why the damage recovery
should not relate to the damages caused by, rather than the size of, the defendant." S. REP.

No. 428, supra note 17, at 19.
166. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
167. Id. at 408.
168. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48
U.S.L.W. 3813 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). The risk of liability for an innocent de-
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The treble damage action is not an end in itself, but should be construed to
give effect to its central purpose of furthering the policies of the antitrust laws.
The denial of contribution does damage to antitrust enforcement. When a law
is administered inequitably, respect for the law itself can be lost. And compliance with a disrespected law can be difficult to achieve. Moreover, the denial
of contribution conflicts with the policy of punishing wrongdoers, a central
purpose of the treble damage action. In both Abraham Construction and
Olson Farms, the rulings denying contribution allow equally guilty coconspirators to escape all damage liability for their conduct. Yet, as the Supreme
Court recently held in Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 69 the treble damage statute should
be construed to assure that violators cannot avoid punishment for their illegal
actions.170
The rule against contribution should be abandoned for, as the Professional
Beauty court put it: "There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in [a] rule
which permits the entire burden of restitution of a loss for which two parties
are responsible to be placed upon one alone because of the plaintiff's whim or
spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer."'171
THE PRocEDURE
A fair and efficient contribution system requires workable procedural rules.
Four of the most important questions are: (a) the manner in which claims for
contribution should be asserted; (b) the statute of limitations applicable to
contribution claims; (c) the persons against whom contribution can be sought;
and (d) the appropriate measure of contribution.
Manner in Which to Assert Claims
Contribution advocates generally agree that claims for contribution should
be allowed as counterclaims, third-party claims, cross-claims or in separate
actions. 72 Ideally, all claims for contribution should be resolved together with
the question of liability in the main action. However, it is important to allow
the courts flexibility so that they can prevent defendants from unduly complicating a plaintiff's case with claims for contribution. Therefore, in proper
cases, courts should be able to require severance of contribution claims.173
fendant is heightened by the complexity of antitrust cases and the concomitant confusion that
can affect a jury's verdict. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Mach.
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). This risk may be further heightened by the rule that, once the existence of
a conspiracy is proved; only "slight evidence" is needed to connect additional participants.
See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d 117, 126 (7th Cir. 1978).
169. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
170. Id. at 314. Additionally, the rule against contribution can serve to increase economic
concentration. In some cases, plaintiffs have elected to recover from relatively small defendants,
forcing those companies to leave the field and allowing their larger rivals to dominate. See
Senate Hearings,supra note 14, at 121 (statement of Don T. Hibner, Jr.).
171. 594 F.2d at 1185-86 (borrowing heavily from W. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 307).
172. See S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Section Proposal, supra note 10, at E-3;
UNiroim CoTRmutoN AMONG Toa'rrAsoRs Aar § 3(a) (1955).
173.

See text accompanying notes 143-146 supra.
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Separate actions for contribution should also be permitted, for example, in
cases where the person against whom contribution is sought is not within the
74
jurisdiction of the court in which the main action is being litigated.
Applicable Statute of Limitations
The general rule in jurisdictions allowing contribution is that the cause of
action for contribution does not accrue at the time of the underlying tort;
rather, the statute of limitations begins to run when the party claiming contribution has in fact paid more than his contributive share.17 5 The ABA Section
of Antitrust Law, however, has proposed that, in general, a claim for contribution must be filed within one year after filing the underlying complaint. 7 6
The Antitrust Section's proposal is based on a belief:
that it is desirable to require claims for contribution to be filed as soon
as possible after they are apparent ....

Permitting a defendant routinely

to file a contribution claim at any time during the pendency of the
plaintiff's action or thereafter could prejudice any new party from whom
contribution is sought, particularly after the
basis for liability and the
7
formula for damages have been establishedY 7
This concern is real, but it nevertheless seems insufficient to justify such an
untested and extreme departure from the procedure that has worked well in
the many jurisdictions where contribution has existed for some time. In the
great majority of cases, third parties would be brought in at an early time,
certainly before liability is established; otherwise, the original defendant would
incur the expense of proving anew the third-party's complicity and run the
risk of a failure of proof.
The practical effect of the Antitrust Section's proposal would be to make
contribution an issue in every Sherman Act case, except for the few based
solely on unilateral conduct. The contribution claims would have to be filed
or be forever lost. This seems unnecessary; where the question of contribution
can be avoided, it should be.'

78

The problem of having to extend the time within which the new parties
174. Section Proposal,supra note 10, at E-3.
175. E.g., Globig v. Greene & Gust Co., 184 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Wis. 1960); Markey v.
Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 322 A.2d 513 (1974); Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 44 N.Y.2d
49, 375 N.E.2d 29, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978).
176. Section Proposal, supra note 10, at E-3. The proposed statute reads: "Claims for
contribution will be barred unless they are filed (i) within one year of the date of service of

the original complaint giving rise to potential liability, or (ii) within sixty (60) days after the
claimant for contribution receives reasonable notice of his liability or potential liability based
in whole or in part upon damages caused by the wrongful acts or omission of another,
whichever date occurs later. Notwithstanding the foregoing, claims for contribution shall be
barred unless they are filed within sixty (60) days after the entry of final judgment by the
district court awarding damages against a prospective claimant for contribution." Id.

177.

Id.
The Antitrust Section itself pointed out that the defendants should be allowed
sufficient time to try to negotiate a sharing agreement before being required to file contribution claims. Id.
178.
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may be sued is unavoidable.17 9 An appropriate legislative solution seems to be
the one adopted in section 3(c) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-

feasors Act,180 which requires the contribution action to be brought within one
year of the final judgment in the original action. If the courts adopt a contribution rule in the absence of congressional legislation, it seems clear that state
statutes of limitation will be applicable.18' In those states which have adopted

the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the applicable limitations
period would be as stated above. Most of the other states that allow contribu-

tion use the statute of limitations applicable to implied contracts, under which
the cause of action similarly accrues at the time the party claiming contribution
has paid more than his contributive share. 8 2 This seems to be the appropriate

statute to apply in those states where contribution is not allowed.
PersonsFrom Whom ContributionMay Be Sought
The Antitrust Section has proposed that "[c]ontribution rights may be
claimed only against those persons for whose wrongful acts or omissions plaintiff seeks to recover damages from one or more defendants."' 83 Under this
propogal, contribution could be claimed against non-defendants only if the
plaintiff relies on their conduct as part of his damage theory.184 This proposal
seems sound because defendants should not be allowed to unduly complicate a
plaintiff's case by bringing in parties whose conduct is not relevant to the
plaintiff's theory. Yet, the Antitrust Section's proposal seems to imply that
contribution may not be claimed against a non-defendant non-conspirator
whose sales are included in the plaintiff's damage case under an "umbrella"
theory. 8 5 However, by including their sales in the damage theory, the plaintiff
has put the non-conspirators' conduct in issue. Defendants should be allowed
the opportunity to prove that such "non-conspirators" in fact participated in
the conspiracy and that, therefore, the "non-conspirators" should bear their
part of the damage burden. Absent such a provision, the door to collusion
between the plaintiff and the "non-conspirators" would be wide open. The
plaintiff and the "non-conspirator" could settle for an unfairly low amount and
the "non-conspirator" could escape all liability by being designated a "nonconspirator" by the plaintiff. Naturally, if the non-conspirators' guilt could
179. See Commissioner's Comment,

UNFORm CoNTRmunoN AMoNG TORT.SORS

Acr

§ 3(c)

(1955).
180. Id.
181. See Note, supra note 74, at 1399-1400; text accompanying note 76 supra.
182. See Blum v. Good Humor Corp., 57 App. Div. 2d 911, 394 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't
1977); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262, 201 N.W.2d 758 (1972).
183. Section Proposal,supranote 10, at E-3.
184. "Thus, in a horizontal price fixing case, where the plaintiff offers a damage schedule
based upon purchases from a nondefendant co-conspirator, contribution could be claimed
from that nondefendant. Similarly, where plaintiff claims injury from an unlawful vertical
arrangement between a defendant and a nondefendant, contribution against the nondefendant
could be sought by the defendant." Id.
185. See note 18 and accompanying text, supra. The problem does not arise if the
umbrella theory is rejected, as it was as a matter of law by the Third Circuit in Mid-West
Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc. 596 F.2d 573, 580-87 (3d Cir. 1979).
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not be established at trial, they would be liable neither for contribution nor
to the plaintiff; only actual conspirators would be liable for the damages.
There is general agreement that contribution should not be allowed against
settling defendants and that there should be mandatory claim reduction to
discourage unfair settlements.1 86 However, there is an apparent difference
between the Antitrust Section and Senate Judiciary Committee proposals as to
whether contribution should be allowed against defendants that do not settle
in good faith.187 With mandatory claim reduction, the incentive for plaintiffs
to enter into unfair settlements should be removed and it seems unlikely that
parties would enter into bad faith settlements. Additionally, it might be inappropriate to invite litigation on the question by explicitly legislating an exception to the sound policy of encouraging "a party to settle a case once and
for all."'1 8 Nevertheless, there should be an implicit exception for bad faith

settlements. For the very rare case in which mandatory claim reduction fails
in its objective of ending unfair settlements, or in which sharing agreements
are not entered into,18 9 the courts should not be foreclosed from taking ap-

propriate action. A bad faith settlement should be regarded as a fraud on the
court and should be subject to the same rules as other judgments procured by
fraud. 1 0 However, the courts should be skeptical of claims of bad faith and
should further the important policy of encouraging settlements by disposing of
unfounded claims summarily.
AppropriateMeasure of Contribution
The widest area of disagreement among contribution advocates concerns
the determination of contributive shares. The ABA Antitrust Section has opted
for equitable shares based on the parties' relative responsibility for the damages;' 9 ' the ProfessionalBeauty court chose pro rata shares;1 92 and the proposed
Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act, which would apply only in horizontal pricefixing cases, would base the contributive shares primarily on the defendants'
purchases or sales. 93 A preferable method is: (a) in cases where the defendants
186. See text accompanying notes 150-167 supra. Similarly, settling defendants should not
be allowed to seek contribution. See Section Propsal,supra note 10, at E-3 to E-4.
187. Compare S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 24 (bad faith exception) with Section
Proposal,supra note 10, at E-3 to E-4 (no bad faith exception).
188. Section Proposal,supra note 10, at E-3. The Antitrust Section proposes a requirement
that settling defendants, to avail themselves of the protection against claims for contribution,
notify all parties of the settlement agreement within 60 days of its execution. Id. This seems
to be a sound requirement that would lead to more informed planning for parties on both
sides.
189. The provisions of both S. 1468 and the Section Proposal would be superseded by any
sharing agreements the parties choose to enter. This seems clearly appropriate.
190. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 352 U.S. 238 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 118 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979).
191. Section Proposal,supra note 10, at E-3, E-4.
192. 594 F.2d at 1182 & nA.
193. S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 21-24. The text of the proposed provision is as
follows: "A release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment received in settlement by one or two or more persons subject to contribution under this section shall not
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stand in a horizontal relationship and the plaintiff's damages are based on
purchases from or sales to any of the defendants, contributive shares should be
measured on the basis of the defendants' purchases or sales; (b) in all other
cases, it should be presumed that a pro rata measure will apply; however,
this presumption may be rebutted by a showing of extreme unfairness, in
which case contribution should be determined on the basis of relative responsibility. This suggestion has the advantages of each of the three other proposals,
while avoiding their more serious drawbacks. The proposed pro rata/sales-based
rule would eliminate the specter of undue complexity without sacrificing the
flexibility necessary to avoid inequitable results. Its application would thus be
both predictable and fair.
The Antitrust Section proposal of equitable shares based on relative responsibility for damages is similar to the relative fault standard adopted by
some jurisdictions for negligence cases.1 94 The Section's explanation for its
proposal is that:
[i]n many antitrust cases ... , and particularly those involving intentonal price fixing, relative fault may be difficult to assess. The standard
proposed by the Section is more flexible and looks to impact as well as
culpability. Thus, it will permit the court to adopt a measure of contribution appropriate to each type of case. In price fixing cases, for example, where a plaintiff's damages are calculated on the basis of sales,
"relative responsibility" would normally be measured by a given defendant's impact upon the plaintiff, i.e., by his sales in dollars or in
units, taking into account the amount of overcharge, but also taking into
account the extensiveness of the violation, its duration, the transactions
affected, etc. In other cases, where relative sales to the plaintiff would
not be appropriate or even relevant, the standard we propose would
permit the use of relative culpability 6r fault, if appropriate, as the
measure adopted by the court. The Section considered and rejected, at
least as a firm rule for all cases, the "per capita" rule used in the Professional Beauty Supply case on its particular facts. Although such a rule
is simple of application, it does not provide the flexibility needed to
achieve the fairness which we believe is required of a contribution rule
in antitrust cases.1 95
The Section's proposal has many benefits and in actual application it might
not differ too substantially from the pro rata/sales-based rule proposed here.
Nevertheless, it should be rejected. The proposal's central drawback lies in the
very same flexibility that commends it. Predictability of result is crucial if
discharge any other persons from liability unless its terms expressly so provide. The court
shall reduce the claim of the person giving the release or covenant against other persons
subject to liability by the greatest of: (1) any amount stipulated by the release or covenant,
(2) the amount of consideration paid for it, or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to
the settling person's sales or purchases of goods or services. Under item (3) above, actual
damages shall not be trebled in proceedings under section 4A of this Act." Id.
194. E.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974); Gomes v.
Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 469-70 (8d. Cir. 1967); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1402 (McKinney 1976). The
Supreme Court has recently adopted this measure in admiralty cases, overruling a long line
of cases. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 405-11 (1975).
195. Section Proposal,supranote 10, at E-4.
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contribution is to work, and it cannot adequately be achieved under the Section's proposal. Settlements would be far more difficult to reach if the plaintiff
could not predict what he would be surrendering in return for the payment he
would be receiving from the settling defendant. The Section's open-ended
standard would only be justified if fairness could not be achieved by more
predictable means, but such means are available.
The pro rata or per capita standard proposed in Professional Beauty has
worked successfully in complex securities litigation, 9" and has been adopted
in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.197 This rule's central
advantages are predictability of result and ease of administrative application.
Yet it is not as inflexible as it seems, and criticism on that basis is not altogether
justified.
As the pro rata rule is applied in many jurisdictions, and as it should be
applied here, "if equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group
shall constitute a single share ... [and] principles of equity applicable to con-

tribution generally shall apply.''19s Under this kind of provision, for example,
the liability of a corporation and its officers would be treated as a single unit.
And, in a situation where one manufacturer conspired with two dealers to
boycott another manufacturer, it might be provided that half of the liability
be borne by the manufacturer and one-quarter each by the two dealers. The
pro rata rule would seem to be especially appropriate in vertical conspiracy
cases, as well as other cases where it would be extremely difficult to determine
relative responsibility. 99
Despite its benefits, in some cases the pro rata rule would work extremely
inequitable results. For that reason, if a defendant can demonstrate that the
pro rata measure would result in extreme unfairness, the courts should be em2
powered to allocate contributive shares on the basis of relative responsibility. 00
The burden of proof on such a defendant, however, should be a heavy one so as
to discourage litigation and promote one of the central purposes of the pro rata
rule, i.e., predictability of result. Furthermore, the pro rata rule should not be
applicable in horizontal conspiracy cases in which a sales-based formula could
apply. In those cases, an equitable and predictable rule is available without
recourse to the cruder pro rata system.
The sales-based formula of S. 1468, the proposed Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act, 20 ' is ideal for application in price-fixing and other cases where the
196. See Fischer, supra note 70, at 1886-40.
197. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEAORS Acr § 2 (1955). See also W. PRossER,
supra note 39, at 310.
198. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASoRs Acr § 2 (1955). See also Wassel v.

Eglowsky, 899 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.
1976); Larsen v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 282 Minn. 135, 163 N.W.2d 755 (1968); W. PROSSER,
supra note 39, at 310; Fischer, supra note 70, at 1836-40. See generally Corbett, supra note 5,
at 138-39.
199. Cf. S. REP. No. 428, supra note 17, at 30 & n.2 (separate views).

200. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1272 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d. Cir. 1979). For example, the pro rata rule might be inapplicable
in a vertical group boycott case where a marginal conspirator participated only in response
to threats of termination.
201. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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defendants' relationship is horizontal and the plaintiff is a purchaser or seller. 20 2
Under S.1468, the amount of the mandatory claim reduction carve-out is the
larger of the amount provided for in the setlement agreement (or the amount
actually paid) or "treble the actual damages attributable to the settling person's
sales or purchases of goods or services."23 In most cases, S. 1468 would reduce a
plaintiff's damage claim after settlement by the percentage amount of the
settling defendant's market share. For example, assume that a group of plaintiffs sued three defendants for $1,000,000 in trebled damages and settled with
one defendant for $50,000. If the settling defendant's sales to the plaintiffs
represented thirty percent of their purchases, plaintiffs' damage claim would
be reduced by $300,000 to $700,000.204 This method of allocating damages is
equitable, predictable and easy to administer.
Under S. 1468, if a defendant entered or exited the conspiracy on dates
different from the other conspirators, its contributive share would be determined accordingly.205 Assume, for example, that one company enters into a
preexisting conspiracy and participates for only one year; the company's contributive share would include only its sales for the one year. Such a provision
could open the door to collusive settlements. 206 To avoid this possibility, it
should be provided that when a settlement agreement purports to be based on
a defendant's participation in the conspiracy for a period less than its entire
duration, the carve-out amount must include all that defendant's sales or
purchases, including the time during which the defendant was not in the
207
conspiracy.

202. Indeed, the main drawback of S. 1468 is that it applies only to price-fixing cases; in
all other kinds of cases, it would leave it to the courts to decide whether contribution should
be available at all. S. RF'. No. 428, supra note 17, at 12.
203. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
204. Note that under S. 1468, the carve-out is based solely on the defendant's own sales
to the plaintiff. For example, assume that a plaintiff who purchased from only two dedendants sued three defendants, seeking $10,000 in trebled damages. If the plaintiff settled
for $100 with the defendant from which he did not purchase, the amount of the claim
reduction would only be $100 irrespective of the settling defendant's market share. S. REP No.
428, supra note 17, at 22-23. In most class action cases, however, this distinction will make no
difference because the class members will have purchased from all defendants.
205. Id. at 22. The Section Proposal, supra note 10, at E-4, would include a similar
provision.
206. For example, the plaintiff might settle with one defendant at a low rate and claim a
low carve-out amount by contending that the settling defendant was in the conspiracy only
for a short period. The plaintiff might still seek damages for the settling defendant's nonconspiratorial sales based on an "umbrella" theory. The problem does not arise if the
"umbrella" theory is rejected. See notes 18 & 185 supra.
207. This reasoning might be criticized on the ground that it would compel short-term
participants in a conspiracy to pay higher amounts to settle than warranted by their conduct.
The view here, however, is that the danger of collusive settlements outweighs the danger of
unfairly penalizing short-term participants. No solution is perfectly satisfactory and, in the
absence of any contribution rule, short-term participants remain liable for all the damages
caused for the duration of the conspiracy. Dextone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 60 F.2d
47,48 (2d Cir. 1932).
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CONCLUSION

Despite the debate over the procedural rules needed to eliminate the objections of contribution's opponents, the central point should not be lost. There
is no room for a rule that fosters collusion and intimidation in a judicial system
that prides itself on its fairness. To restore justice to an area from which it has
been absent and to better the administration of the antitrust laws, the right to
contribution should be recognized.
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